Latin America Daily Security Brief

A bomb attack struck a military base in Cali on April 24, wounding two soldiers. AFP journalists on the scene observed a burned-out bus parked directly in front of the installation. Army sources told AFP that five gas cylinders were launched from the bus before a subsequent explosion damaged the base's structure. Authorities and local media are pointing to FARC dissident factions as the likely perpetrators, with Colombian elections scheduled for May 31 adding political urgency to the incident.

President Gustavo Petro flew to Caracas on April 24 for a meeting with Venezuela's acting president Delcy Rodríguez — the first visit by any head of government to Venezuela since the U.S. military operation in January that ended with Nicolás Maduro's capture. The two sides announced immediate mechanisms for intelligence sharing and confirmed the development of joint military plans targeting armed groups operating along their 2,200-kilometer shared border.

The Catatumbo region remains the focal point of the bilateral security agenda. Semana reports that between January 2025 and April 2026, armed violence in Norte de Santander province killed 192 people, including 19 security force members, while displacing 101,883 and confining 283 others. ELN fighters are now pressing toward the Área Metropolitana de Cúcuta, with graffiti from both the ELN and FARC dissidents appearing in urban neighborhoods, according to a Gobernación Norte de Santander report cited by Semana.

A separate massacre in Cúcuta on April 24 left three dead and three wounded, per El Espectador. Military sources attribute the attack to the FARC's Frente 33 pushing into the metro area as conflict pressure from El Catatumbo disperses outward — a significant geographic expansion of the violence.

ACLED-tracked data reported by El Colombiano shows confinement victims from armed conflict rose 63% in the first quarter of 2026. More than 39,000 people were confined — unable to leave their communities due to armed group control — in the same period, according to ICNDiario. Active groups include the ELN, EMC-FARC, Segunda Marquetalia, Clan del Golfo, and the Autodefensas Unidas de Nariño.

The Petro-Rodríguez meeting in Caracas on April 24 is the clearest sign yet that Venezuela's post-Maduro government is willing to re-engage with neighbors on security terms that previous leadership rejected. Rodríguez told reporters the two countries would begin immediate intelligence sharing and develop 'military plans' targeting drug trafficking, fuel smuggling, and other transnational criminal operations along the border.

Rodríguez's statement directly addressed criminal networks: 'Let the narco-trafficking groups, those involved in fuel smuggling and other contraband, know that we are taking firm steps.' The language is notably stronger than anything Caracas produced under Maduro's security posture, though follow-through remains unverified.

An analysis published April 24 by Latinoamérica 21 argues that even with elevated oil prices, Venezuela's hollowed institutional base means oil revenue no longer converts into effective state power or regional influence. The piece is a useful frame for understanding why Rodríguez's government needs the Colombia relationship — Caracas currently lacks the independent capacity to police its own border zone.

The Comité Permanente por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos de Guayaquil (CDH) released a formal report on April 24 declaring an 'unprecedented' forced displacement crisis driven by gang violence. The report focuses on Socio Vivienda, a neighborhood in northwestern Guayaquil where repeated police interventions have failed to dislodge criminal groups. On March 6, 2025, 22 people were killed in a single attack blamed on Los Tiguerones factions, forcing approximately 300 families to flee the same day.

The CDH report calls on the government to formally recognize internal forced displacement by violence as a legal category, create a national registry of displaced persons, and fund relocation subsidies and neighborhood rehabilitation programs. Community leaders who flee are being tracked and persecuted by criminal groups even in their new locations, the report notes.

Separate incidents on April 24 in Guayaquil: a 34-year-old man with prior criminal convictions was shot and killed outside a church in the Guasmo Sur district's Cooperativa 5 de Octubre, and a second armed attack in Samanes 2 killed another man who had a pending court date in an active judicial process. Both killings are consistent with targeted gang-on-gang or gang-on-witness patterns.

A U.S. military anti-drug trafficking operation launched in Ecuador was reported by MSN on April 25. Details remain thin, but the operation appears tied to the broader U.S. security posture shift in the region following Ecuador's sustained violence crisis. Ecuador holds the highest homicide rate in Latin America, per teleSUR, making it a priority partner for Washington's anti-narcotics efforts.

The mass trial of 486 MS-13 leaders and senior members continued this week at the CECOT mega-prison in Tecoluca, now in its fourth day as of April 24. Prosecutors have charged the defendants with more than 47,000 crimes committed between 2012 and 2022, per Reuters. Defendants watched proceedings on large screens inside the prison, shackled and in full view of press cameras — a deliberate display of state power.

Since the state of exception began in April 2022, Bukele's government has detained over 91,000 people, primarily suspected MS-13 and Barrio 18 members, with constitutional rights suspended throughout. Critics, including the World Socialist Web Site, warn the model is being exported: Ecuador, Honduras, and Costa Rica have all adopted elements of Bukele's security framework, with Trump administration backing normalizing the approach across the region.

El Salvador also led the Centam Guardian 2026 multinational exercise this week, with more than 1,200 troops from regional nations participating in coordinated land, sea, and air operations targeting narcotics trafficking and gang networks, per El Pueblo SV.

InSight Crime published a detailed profile on April 25 of Rosalinda González Valencia, alias 'La Jefa' — widow of CJNG founder Nemesio 'El Mencho' Oseguera Cervantes, killed in a February federal operation, and the cartel's longtime financial architect. The piece traces her role building CJNG's money-laundering infrastructure as the group rose to become one of Mexico's dominant criminal organizations. With El Mencho gone since February, the succession question is whether La Jefa formally consolidates operational control or shares it with senior plaza bosses.

Reuters reported that U.S. law enforcement raided the Houston offices of Ikon Midstream, a fuel trading company, as part of an investigation into illicit fuel and stolen crude oil flows connected to Mexican cartels. The U.S. government describes fuel theft (huachicol) as cartels' second-largest revenue stream after narcotics. The raid coincides with Argentina's April 23 arrest of Mexican Navy Rear Admiral Fernando Farías Laguna in Buenos Aires — identified by Argentina's Security Ministry as a key node in a network trafficking fuel from the U.S. into Mexico disguised as oils and additives.

Mexico's Security Cabinet announced operations on April 23 across Baja California, Jalisco, Morelos, Oaxaca, Querétaro, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tabasco — resulting in arrests, searches, weapons seizures, and drug confiscations. El País reported separately that 10 members of the Cartel del Pacífico were captured in an operation described as tightening the net around a high-value target.

Mexican cartels are recruiting retired Colombian military personnel, according to reporting by PolíticoMX and Puerto Vallarta News on April 24. The hires appear to be for tactical training — improving the lethality and discipline of cartel enforcer units, particularly in contested territories.

Argentina and the United States jointly launched the Centro Regional de Información y Análisis sobre Crimen Organizado (CRIACO) this week, with Security Minister Alejandra Monteoliva and U.S. Under Secretary of State Thomas DiNanno presiding. The center will aggregate criminal intelligence across the Southern Cone to support counter-narcotics and anti-organized crime operations. Peter Thiel's Palantir Technologies was identified as a potential data infrastructure partner.

The April 23 arrest of Mexican Navy Rear Admiral Farías Laguna in Buenos Aires added immediate credibility to the new center's mandate. The operation demonstrates functioning cross-border law enforcement cooperation between Argentina and the U.S. ahead of the formal CRIACO launch.

A separate diplomatic friction point: a U.S. security official publicly expressed concern about Chinese infrastructure investments in Argentina — specifically communications and port infrastructure — calling on Buenos Aires to weigh commercial interests against national security risks. China is a top trading partner for both countries, making the ask politically delicate for Milei's government.

Peru's Defense Minister Carlos Diaz and multiple cabinet colleagues resigned on April 24 in protest over a stalled deal to purchase U.S. fighter jets. Diaz said the acquisition was a matter of national defense, not politics — framing the resignation as a statement against what he characterized as obstruction of a legitimate security procurement. The specific aircraft and the source of the blockage were not confirmed in wire reporting.

Bolivia's Defense Minister Marcelo Salinas held bilateral meetings with Peru's ambassador on April 24, covering defense cooperation — a routine diplomatic touchpoint but notable given Peru's cabinet instability and Bolivia's ongoing landlocked-access sensitivities.

A senior Costa Rican police official stated publicly on April 25 that the country has become a narco-trafficking 'hub,' attributing the surge in homicides over recent years directly to turf wars between drug trafficking networks. Costa Rica has no military, making it structurally vulnerable as trafficking routes through the isthmus intensify.

Costa Rican authorities also dismantled a criminal organization on April 24 that used formal businesses and high-value assets to launder narco proceeds, per Infobae. The operation reflects increasing institutional capacity but also the depth of cartel financial penetration into the legitimate economy.

A separate trade dispute broke out between Costa Rica and Panama, with San José accusing Panama of an effective 'commercial embargo' following a WTO ruling. Costa Rica's trade minister called it inexplicable given the two countries share the only demilitarized border in the world. The Alliance for Development in Democracy (ADD) — which includes Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, and the Dominican Republic — also issued a joint statement backing Panama after Iran seized a Panamanian-flagged vessel.

Chile and the United States signed a security and law enforcement cooperation agreement this week, including an amendment to their narcotics control framework that formalizes collaboration between the FBI and Chile's Investigative Police (PDI). The deal includes $1 million in U.S. funding. U.S. Under Secretary DiNanno was in Santiago before traveling to Buenos Aires for the CRIACO launch — a coordinated Southern Cone security engagement sweep.

The Strait of Magellan sovereignty dispute sparked by Argentine Rear Admiral Hernán Montero's comments last week continues to simmer. The Chilean government has consolidated a unified public position defending its sovereignty, while internal debate focuses on how slowly the executive responded to Montero's remarks. No formal diplomatic protest has been filed.

Cuba publicly stated on April 24 that the release of political prisoners is not part of any agreement with the United States, even as high-level back-channel talks between the two governments continue. The statement pushes back directly on reports that prisoner releases were being discussed as part of a negotiated arrangement.

The Cuban government has acknowledged it is in crisis — a rare admission — as U.S. maximum pressure policy, including fuel and financial sanctions, continues to squeeze the island's already-collapsed economy. U.S. State Department officials held a press briefing this week on additional humanitarian support for the Cuban people, suggesting Washington is trying to separate population welfare from regime pressure.

The Dominican Republic announced in late February that it would build a network of dry ports along the Haiti border, backed by more than $300 million in private investment. The project is framed as an 'economic wall' — a commercial and logistical barrier designed to formalize cross-border trade and reduce smuggling. Implementation details and timelines remain unclear.

Haiti's security situation remains at crisis baseline: roughly 150-200 armed gangs operate nationwide, with armed groups controlling an estimated 85-90% of Port-au-Prince, per crime index data. No material change in the past 24 hours, but the gang control footprint continues to expand into previously stable areas.

SICA — the Central American Integration System — held a restructuring and modernization meeting in the Dominican Republic on April 25, with all eight member states represented (Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and the Dominican Republic). No specific operational outcomes were disclosed.

Guatemala's government accused Venezuela-based hackers of breaching its arms control database, according to Escudo Digital on April 25. The breach reportedly compromised sensitive weapons registry data. If confirmed, it would mark one of the most significant state-attributed cyberattacks in Central America in recent years.