Latin America Daily Security Brief

President Gustavo Petro formally ended peace negotiations with the FARC dissident faction led by Alexander Díaz, alias 'Calarcá,' on April 22, according to Reuters and El País. The move effectively buries his 'Total Peace' policy — the centerpiece of his presidency — which aimed to negotiate simultaneous surrender agreements with all major armed groups. Petro has also threatened to freeze the separate ELN track, the most advanced process still nominally alive.

Amnesty International released a damning assessment of the Petro government's security record on April 22, declaring Colombia in a full humanitarian crisis. Codhes documented 139 mass displacement events and 80 armed confinements in 2025 alone. The Catatumbo region — where ELN and FARC dissident clashes displaced more than 82,000 people between January and September — was cited as the most acute flashpoint. AI's regional subdirector Valentina Ballesta warned of an increasing use of lethal force across Colombia and Venezuela.

Colombia's Fiscalía (Attorney General's office) executed asset forfeiture actions against 30 properties linked to FARC dissident commander 'Iván Mordisco,' with estimated value exceeding $6 million USD. The action signals the state is shifting toward punitive measures even as diplomatic peace tracks collapse. The Mordisco faction has banned UN verification missions and humanitarian organizations from entering its controlled zones since March 18.

The Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) published a report identifying 10 departments where armed groups tied to the Total Peace process continue operating with near-total impunity — Nariño, Putumayo, Arauca, and Norte de Santander among them. All four share borders with Ecuador or Venezuela, reinforcing the transnational dimension of the conflict that a domestic peace process alone cannot address.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) released findings showing armed conflict is causing ecological devastation at the rate of one animal death every 30 minutes, with 44 species now at extinction risk due to fighting, landmines, and displacement of communities that previously served as environmental stewards.

Multiple outlets confirmed April 22 that the two U.S. Embassy officials killed in Sunday's car crash in the sierra of Chihuahua were covert CIA operatives, not standard diplomatic staff. Two Mexican officials also died. President Sheinbaum announced a formal investigation into the extent of U.S. intelligence operations on Mexican soil and reiterated at her Wednesday press conference that she has refused Trump administration proposals to send U.S. troops into Mexico.

Sheinbaum drew a clear line: intelligence sharing with Washington is acceptable; unilateral operations are not. The Chihuahua state government is separately under scrutiny, with La Jornada raising questions about possible complicity between state officials and U.S. agents. The CIA angle significantly raises the diplomatic stakes beyond a standard consular incident.

A gunman opened fire from atop the Pyramid of the Moon at Teotihuacán on April 22, killing at least one tourist and wounding 13 others before taking his own life. Infobae reported the attack was premeditated. Mexican authorities confirmed no cartel link — the BBC characterized it as an isolated act. Mexico pledged to increase security at tourist sites ahead of the 2026 FIFA World Cup, which the country co-hosts.

Mexico's Security Cabinet reported coordinated operations on April 20 across Baja California, Chihuahua, Estado de México, Guanajuato, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tamaulipas — with arrests, weapons seizures, and drug confiscations. Separately, 10 people including six municipal police officers were detained in Jilotzingo, Estado de México after a violent cargo truck robbery; the local security director allegedly attempted to bribe state officers during the operation.

El País and Infobae note that violence tied to post-El Mencho fragmentation of CJNG continues to generate fighting across Michoacán, Sinaloa, and Sonora. The mayor of Uruapan, Carlos Manzo — who had built a political movement around peacebuilding — was assassinated in the center of his city.

El Salvador opened the largest mass criminal trial in its history on April 22: 486 alleged MS-13 members, including the gang's top leadership, face charges spanning 47,000 crimes committed between 2012 and 2022. The charges include homicide, femicide, extortion, and arms trafficking. Defendants viewed proceedings via screens in a prison facility rather than appearing in a courtroom.

UPI reported that prosecutors presented witnesses on April 22 who directly implicated 22 MS-13 leaders as having ordered thousands of crimes. The trial is a direct product of Bukele's state of emergency, in force since March 2022, under which security forces have detained more than 91,500 people and Congress authorized mass-trial procedures.

In the United States, eight MS-13 members were separately sentenced to decades in federal prison for murders carried out at the direction of gang leadership in El Salvador, per the Department of Justice. The U.S. cases relied heavily on law enforcement partnerships with Salvadoran authorities — a cooperation framework Bukele has actively cultivated with the Trump administration.

Peru's Defense Minister Carlos Díaz and Foreign Minister both resigned on April 23 in protest after President Dina Boluarte's government reversed course on a signed contract to purchase U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets. The ministers characterized the reversal as a betrayal of an already-executed agreement. Díaz said the purchase was not political — it was a matter of national defense.

The Foreign Minister warned the reversal made Peru 'a country that cannot be trusted in a negotiation process.' The U.S. ambassador to Peru, businessman Bernardo Navarro, had issued a public warning last week widely interpreted as pressure tied to the deal. Whether the reversal was driven by budget constraints, political opposition, or U.S. pressure over other issues — including Peru's election dynamics — is not yet clear.

Bloomberg reported April 22 that leftist presidential candidate Roberto Sánchez, who is on the verge of qualifying for Peru's runoff election, is pledging to overhaul mining rules if elected. Peru is one of the world's top copper exporters. Combined with the cabinet collapse, the political picture heading into the July 28 presidential transition is increasingly volatile.

CBS News reported — approximately 1 hour ago at time of writing — that a high-ranking lieutenant of a major drug trafficking organization will be extradited from Ecuador to the United States. This follows the joint U.S.-Ecuador military operations launched in early March against organizations designated as terrorist entities.

Ecuador and the United States signed a formal security cooperation agreement this week specifically targeting transnational criminal organizations engaged in narcotrafficking, per Ecuadorian government sources. The agreement formalizes joint operations that have already been underway and establishes a framework for intelligence sharing and extradition.

InSight Crime's analysis of Daniel Kinahan's arrest in Dubai — published April 22 — is directly relevant to Ecuador's criminal environment. Kinahan's network is a key broker between Latin American cocaine producers and European distribution markets. Ecuador sits at the export end of that supply chain. Any disruption at the European brokerage level tends to trigger price and power shifts that ripple back to port-city gangs in Guayaquil.

Wikipedia's current event tracking (used here as an aggregator of wire reports) reflects an ongoing post-Maduro transition environment in Venezuela following U.S. intervention earlier in 2026. A Venezuelan oil blockade has contributed to a cascading energy crisis in Cuba, where the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign — including near-total oil shipment blockades — has produced prolonged blackouts, fuel shortages, and severe price increases.

An exiled Cuban historian predicted a democratic transition in Cuba by November 2026, citing U.S. government impatience with Havana's alliances with Russia and China, per reporting published April 22. Cuba has agreed to release 51 political prisoners as part of what's being framed as preliminary diplomatic engagement. The Carnegie Endowment hosted a forum on Cuba policy this week.

InSight Crime's Venezuela mining law analysis (published 3 days ago — recent context) notes that Maduro's new gold mining legislation — designed to attract foreign investment — does nothing to address criminal and corrupt control over actual production in mining zones. The ELN, which has functioned as a de facto border state and narcotics gatekeeper along the Colombia-Venezuela frontier, stands to benefit from continued governance gaps in the mining sector regardless of what Caracas legislates.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Dominican Republic officials this week to discuss Haiti policy, with two priorities on the agenda: the HOPE/HELP trade programs (which generate roughly one job in the Dominican Republic for every three created in Haiti) and the security pathway to Haiti's August 30 general elections. The Provisional Electoral Council must establish acceptable security conditions before elections can proceed.

Gang control of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas continues to block humanitarian access and electoral preparation. No new armed group developments were reported in the past 24 hours, but the structural crisis remains unchanged — elections in four months look increasingly unrealistic given the security environment.

Paraguay confirmed this week it will accept up to 25 non-citizen deportees per month from the United States as part of Trump's third-country deportation program, per Reuters and Al Jazeera. Foreign Minister Ramírez Lezcano specified that Paraguay retains the right to reject individual cases after conducting its own security assessment.

Paraguay joins a growing list of regional governments — including El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama — that have signed similar arrangements with Washington, reflecting the Trump administration's success in building a deportation infrastructure across Latin America.

Costa Rica's Security Minister publicly criticized legislators this week amid data showing a dramatic surge in drug seizures. Authorities seized significantly more narcotics in the equivalent period of 2026 compared to 7,054 kilograms seized in the same timeframe in 2025 — a figure the minister described as evidence of escalating transhipment pressure, not improved enforcement alone.

The minister's criticism of lawmakers suggests a political dispute over resources and legal tools for law enforcement, even as Costa Rica's position as a key cocaine transit corridor to Europe becomes more acute.

Brazil is moving forward with plans to acquire four Tamandaré-class frigates in partnership with Germany, according to defense industry reporting published April 22. The frigates are designed for multi-mission operations in the South Atlantic, with stated objectives including protection of offshore energy infrastructure and extended maritime reach. Brazil has already received its first Tamandaré-class vessel.

Brazil announced a R$15 billion credit plan that includes chemicals sector financing, per reporting this week — part of a broader industrial investment push. Defense industry analysts note that defense procurement is increasingly following investment flows into Brazil's industrial base, with licensed production arrangements a centerpiece of the strategy.

Argentina's organized crime environment is undergoing structural transformation, according to the Global Organized Crime Index 2025 (reported on April 22). The index flags rising complexity in criminal networks, growing illicit economies, and weakening state response capacity. The capture of Sebastián Marset — the 'King of the South' — is cited as a significant disruption to regional narcotrafficking but not a structural fix.

A long-planned trans-oceanic corridor connecting Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay across 3,250 kilometers received renewed attention in regional press this week, with China named as a key financing partner. The corridor has geopolitical implications beyond trade — it cuts through zones of active criminal competition and could reshape logistics for both licit and illicit cargo.

Bolivia's new administration considered a decree in February that would fast-track regulatory exemptions for nearly 4,000 non-compliant mining operations — including waivers on environmental permits required under a 2014 law. The Guardian reported April 22 that cacao farmers have been pushing back against gold mining expansion in the Amazon. A court separately suspended mining outside authorized areas along Bolivia's Madre de Dios River, a decision advocates are treating as a partial win.