Cuba's power grid has collapsed for the third time this month, accelerating what looks like a genuine regime crisis — and Trump is making public threats about "taking Cuba" as secret negotiations reportedly run in parallel. The one-month anniversary of El Mencho's killing is prompting a serious reckoning with CJNG succession and ongoing fragmentation across Mexico's cartel landscape. Kristi Noem's "Shield of the Americas" tour is actively reshaping security partnerships across the hemisphere, with Colombia notably absent from the coalition.
Cuba's national power grid collapsed for the third time in March, plunging the island into a nationwide blackout. AP and NPR reported on March 22 that restoration efforts were underway, but the pace of collapse — three times in under 30 days — points to systemic failure, not a fixable technical problem.
The energy crisis is directly tied to Venezuela's removal from the picture. Trump's oil blockade, implemented after the U.S. deposed Nicolas Maduro in January, cut off Cuba's primary fuel supply. The Cuban government blames the U.S. energy blockade. Washington says it will act to protect national security interests and is demanding political prisoner releases and democratic reforms as preconditions for sanctions relief.
Behind the public pressure, Reuters and other outlets report that secret talks are underway between the U.S. and Cuba — with the Castro family possibly involved. Cuba has already agreed to release 51 political prisoners as part of preliminary negotiations begun March 13. Cuba's Vice Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossio said publicly that Cuban armed forces 'are ready to mobilize' in case of U.S. military aggression.
Trump has repeatedly suggested Cuba's government is on the verge of collapse and has said he'd 'soon have the honor of taking Cuba.' The dual-track approach — negotiation and military threat — is being watched closely across the region.
It has been one month since the military operation that killed CJNG leader Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, 'El Mencho.' El País Mexico published a detailed accounting of the violence that followed: 25 prison guards killed, 35 cartel members killed, 70 detained, one civilian killed in crossfire, and approximately 250 roadblocks established across Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Colima, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, and Sinaloa.
Federal Security Secretary Omar García Harfuch confirmed those figures publicly in the days after the operation. The government has defended its handling of the succession crisis, but El País notes significant 'loose ends' — questions about who controls CJNG's command structure, its financial networks, and its operational capacity remain unanswered.
Mexico's Navy seized cocaine aboard submarines and vessels in the Pacific in a separate operation. Secretaría de Marina reporting shows roughly 40 tonnes of cocaine seized in naval operations during 2025 alone, with over 60 tonnes total during the current federal administration — primarily in Pacific waters off Guerrero, Oaxaca, Michoacán, and Colima.
Bloomberg reported March 19 that the Navy killed 11 Sinaloa Cartel-linked individuals in a separate recent operation, suggesting the military is pressing actions on multiple cartel fronts simultaneously.
The ELN attacked Colombian military forces in Arauca on March 21, killing two soldiers and wounding eight. Crónica del Quindío reported the strike, which came despite ongoing — and clearly fragile — peace process negotiations.
The governor of Chocó, Colombia's Pacific department, has raised an alert that FARC dissidents may exploit the ELN's ongoing armed strike to push into areas where ELN activity is creating a security vacuum. Blu Radio and Infobae reported this week that the ELN is using coercion in Chocó to move troops, coca, and gold — treating the department as a logistics corridor.
Colombia is conspicuously absent from Trump's 'Shield of the Americas' coalition. El País and Colombian media noted this week that President Petro's government has explicitly resisted U.S. military pressure across the region. Reports from Infobae indicate U.S. federal agencies are in preliminary stages of an investigation into Petro's alleged narco connections — no charges are imminent, but it is politically damaging during an election cycle.
France 24 reported March 21 that Colombia and Ecuador have de-escalated a recent diplomatic tension. Details of the original dispute remain thin in current OSINT, but both governments signaled a return to functional bilateral relations.
Costa Rica extradited former magistrate Celso Gamboa and alleged trafficker Edwin 'Pecho de Rata' López to the United States on Friday. The Collin County, Texas jail released the first photographs of both men in custody. President Rodrigo Chaves publicly said he hoped Gamboa would 'sing better than Pavarotti' — a pointed signal that Chaves expects the extradition to expose other Costa Rican officials.
The extraditions are part of a broader narrative Costa Rica is trying to establish. A ruling party legislator told Q Costa Rica that the country is 'no longer a haven for organized crime or drug trafficking,' citing recent congressional security legislation.
Costa Rica is simultaneously grappling with U.S. narco-boat strikes in its territorial waters. A SOUTHCOM strike last week killed at least two people; a lone survivor was taken into custody by Costa Rican authorities. Former President José María Figueres publicly backed lethal force against suspected drug boats, a notable shift in tone for a country without a standing army.
Costa Rica and Panama signed a rail agreement this week covering a potential 475-km regional corridor. The Tico Times reported the deal as a step toward regional integration, though significant financing and regulatory hurdles remain.
Honduras formally agreed to partner with the U.S. on joint operations against organized crime, signing onto Trump's 'Shield of the Americas' framework. Kristi Noem visited Tegucigalpa on March 21 and met with President Nasry Asfura, according to Infobae and the Tico Times. Topics included cybersecurity, direct counternarcotics operations, and specialized police and military technical assistance.
Honduras's inclusion in the coalition is notable given that MS-13 and Barrio 18 remain highly active and account for most of the country's homicides and narco-trafficking activity. Washington has designated both gangs as terrorist organizations.
Kristi Noem traveled from Honduras to Punta Cana on March 22 to meet with President Luis Abinader and senior Dominican security officials. Infobae reported the talks covered narcotrafficking networks, border control, intelligence sharing, and coordinated dismantling of Caribbean criminal structures.
The Dominican Republic's participation in Shield of the Americas positions it as a key node in the U.S. Caribbean security architecture — particularly relevant given Cuba's instability next door.
Venezuela's energy sector deterioration is now affecting U.S. policy calculations beyond just Cuba. Global News reported March 18 that the U.S. eased Venezuela oil sanctions specifically to address energy supply pressures created by the Iran war — a significant policy shift driven by global energy markets, not by any improvement in Venezuela's political situation.
With Maduro gone since January, the country's post-Maduro transition remains contested and murky. Venezuela's oil production infrastructure is degraded from years of underinvestment, meaning even a sanctions rollback may not quickly translate into increased output.
The U.S. move to potentially label Brazilian crime syndicates — specifically the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital) and CV (Comando Vermelho) — as terrorist organizations is drawing legal and geopolitical scrutiny. EJIL Talk published an analysis March 18 questioning whether this is a prelude to U.S. use of force. Brazil has been one of the most vocal critics of U.S. military unilateralism in the region, per Foreign Policy reporting.
Brazil's inclusion as a critic of Operation Southern Spear alongside Mexico and Colombia signals a potential emerging bloc of regional powers pushing back against U.S. interventionism — with real implications for multilateral security cooperation.
President-elect José Antonio Kast continues to build his security agenda ahead of his inauguration. Infobae reported that Kast has already met with the presidents of Hungary, El Salvador, and Italy to discuss coordinated responses to organized crime, narcotrafficking, and irregular migration. Chile is a member of the Shield of the Americas coalition.
Kast's campaign pledges included border ditches on Chile's northern border, mass deportations, and maximum-security prison construction — all of which signal a sharp right turn in Chilean security policy that will affect relations with Bolivia and Peru, through which most irregular migration flows enter.
U.S. SOUTHCOM conducted another lethal strike on a suspected drug vessel in the Eastern Pacific last week, killing at least two people. AP reporting cited interviews with locals who said most victims were low-level workers — a fisherman, a motorcycle taxi driver, laborers — not cartel leadership.
The strikes are generating a legal and political backlash across the region. Costa Rica is directly implicated as the country receiving survivors taken into custody. The tension between U.S. operational pressure and Latin American sovereignty concerns is a live issue across multiple bilateral relationships.
HIGH. One month post-El Mencho, CJNG's internal succession is the dominant security variable. Military operations continue against both CJNG remnants and Sinaloa Cartel factions. Travel disruption risk in Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Colima remains elevated. Watch for inter-cartel territorial violence as CJNG fragments.
MODERATE. No significant security developments in the last 24 hours. Irregular migration flows and northern border trafficking corridors remain the baseline concern.
MODERATE. No significant developments. Belize remains a secondary transit corridor; watch for spillover from Guatemalan trafficking routes.
ELEVATED. Post-Shield of the Americas agreement, the operating environment is in transition. MS-13 and Barrio 18 activity remains the primary threat. U.S. technical assistance agreement could shift security force posture in coming weeks.
ELEVATED. El Salvador is a core Shield of the Americas partner. Bukele's security model is being actively exported as a regional template, which has implications for civil liberties and rule-of-law risk in the broader subregion.
ELEVATED. Ortega government's authoritarian posture and exclusion from U.S.-led regional security frameworks means Nicaragua remains a potential permissive environment for trafficking and organized crime.
ELEVATED. The Gamboa extradition and ongoing U.S. narco-boat strikes in Pacific waters put Costa Rica at the center of regional counternarcotics friction. Constitutional limits on use of force are being publicly debated. Organized crime penetration of institutions is the core concern.
MODERATE. Panama is a Shield of the Americas member. Darién corridor trafficking and migration remain persistent pressures. The Costa Rica-Panama rail agreement signals stronger bilateral cooperation.
HIGH. ELN attacks on military forces are active — two soldiers killed in Arauca March 21. Chocó is a multi-actor flashpoint with ELN, FARC dissidents, and trafficking networks converging. Colombia's absence from Shield of the Americas deepens its isolation from U.S. security partnerships while Petro faces domestic political pressure.
HIGH. Post-Maduro political transition is unresolved and the energy sector remains critically degraded. U.S. sanctions easing is calibrated to global energy markets, not political progress in Caracas. Operating environment for foreign businesses remains extremely difficult.
ELEVATED. Criminal violence continues to shift from coastal hotspots into the interior. Ecuador is a Shield of the Americas member and has aligned with U.S. counternarcotics pressure. Diplomatic tension with Colombia has eased but underlying criminal economy drivers are unchanged.
MODERATE. No significant developments in the last 24 hours. Political instability and Andean trafficking routes remain baseline concerns. Border disruptions with Bolivia are seasonal.
MODERATE. Bolivia is part of the Shield of the Americas coalition. No significant security incidents in the last 24 hours. Watch for political tensions around coca policy and U.S. engagement.
ELEVATED. U.S. consideration of terrorist designations for PCC and CV is a live geopolitical friction point. Lula government is aligned with Mexico and Colombia in opposing U.S. military unilateralism. Domestic organized crime threat from PCC and CV remains high in major urban centers.
MODERATE. Paraguay has aligned with U.S. counternarcotics policy and is part of the broader right-leaning bloc backing Washington's regional approach. Tri-border area trafficking remains a structural concern.
MODERATE. No significant security developments. Uruguay remains the most stable operating environment in the Southern Cone.
MODERATE. Milei government has aligned firmly with U.S. regional security policy and is a Shield of the Americas partner. Domestic narco activity in Rosario and Buenos Aires remains a concern but no acute incidents in the last 24 hours.
ELEVATED. Kast's incoming security agenda signals a significant shift in posture — tighter northern borders, harder line on migration, and expanded international security cooperation. Operational changes are weeks to months away from implementation but the direction is clear.
CRITICAL. Third nationwide grid collapse in March. Regime is in acute economic and energy crisis following loss of Venezuelan oil. Secret U.S.-Cuba negotiations are reportedly active but fragile. Military has stated readiness to mobilize. Risk of regime collapse or U.S. military action is higher than at any point since the Missile Crisis era.
CRITICAL. Gang control of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas remains entrenched. No significant change in the last 24 hours, but the baseline is severe — armed groups effectively govern large portions of the country. Multinational security force deployment remains insufficient.
MODERATE. Abinader government is actively engaged in U.S. security partnerships. Noem's March 22 visit signals the DR is a priority node in Caribbean security architecture. Domestic crime and narco-transit risk is managed but persistent.
MODERATE. No significant security developments. Oil sector growth continues to make Guyana a target for organized crime expansion and corruption risk. Watch for trafficking network adaptation as Venezuela's situation evolves next door.
Cuba is the story that could break fast. Three grid collapses in one month is not a maintenance problem — it's a system that is failing. The loss of Venezuelan oil was the trigger, and there is no obvious replacement at scale. Secret talks are happening, but the gap between what Washington is demanding (political liberalization, prisoner releases, movement toward democracy) and what the Castro system can concede without losing control is enormous. Watch whether the 51 prisoner release is a one-time gesture or the beginning of a real negotiating sequence. If talks collapse, Trump's public rhetoric about "taking Cuba" becomes actionable. That would be the most consequential U.S. military move in the hemisphere in decades, and it would detonate across every bilateral relationship in Latin America simultaneously.
The Shield of the Americas coalition is hardening into a real dividing line. Countries in: Honduras, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Panama, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica. Countries out: Mexico, Colombia, Brazil. The "out" group represents the three largest economies in Latin America and the three countries most capable of pushback against U.S. pressure. Watch whether Petro's investigation exposure, Lula's terrorist designation fight, and Mexico's post-CJNG instability give Washington leverage to pull any of them toward the coalition — or whether the three consolidate into a counter-bloc that complicates U.S. operations.
The CJNG succession question is a slow burn that deserves more attention than it's getting. One month out, there is still no confirmed new leader. History from Sinaloa after Chapo's arrest suggests the interregnum is the most dangerous period — not because the cartel collapses, but because regional commanders start competing for the top spot, and that competition is violent. Jalisco, Michoacán, and Guanajuato should be watched for inter-faction firefights over the next 60-90 days.
SOUTHCOM's narco-boat strike program is creating a legal and sovereignty crisis that nobody has resolved yet. Costa Rica is taking custody of survivors from strikes it didn't authorize in waters it claims. Figueres endorsing lethal force is a significant political signal, but it doesn't resolve the constitutional question — and if a strike kills civilians who are clearly not traffickers, the political fallout across the region will be immediate.
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