Argentina is the lead story today: a nationwide general strike paralyzed Buenos Aires, grounded 255 flights, and turned violent at Congress, all while Milei's labor reform bill advances through the lower house anyway. Venezuela's post-Maduro oil opening is generating real movement — Repsol announced plans to triple output, and U.S. officials say production can rise 30-40% this year, but major American firms remain skeptical. Colombia had a productive 24 hours operationally: two ELN narco leaders captured in Bucaramanga, cylinder bombs neutralized in Cauca, and U.S. drones delivered to the Navy — but Petro's peace agenda is effectively dead with no deals signed before his term ends.
Argentina's CGT — the country's largest trade union federation — staged a nationwide general strike on February 20 against President Javier Milei's Labor Modernization bill. Buenos Aires ground to a near-halt: subways stopped, bus lines emptied, shops closed, and garbage went uncollected. State airline Aerolíneas Argentinas cancelled 255 mostly domestic flights, estimating losses of roughly $300 million.
Santiago's international airport in Chile suspended some flights due to strike spillover — a sign of how deeply integrated the two countries' aviation networks are. Maritime workers separately launched a 48-hour strike at the Port of Rosario, one of the world's largest grain export hubs, threatening agricultural export flows.
The protest turned violent outside Congress. Radical left-wing unions threw rocks and bottles at police, who responded with water cannons. Despite the street pressure, the lower house continued debating the bill. Reuters and Al Jazeera both confirm the reform is advancing, with Milei's government expecting final passage by month's end.
The labor reform would make it easier to hire and fire workers, reduce severance pay, cap the right to strike, extend work hours, and limit holiday provisions. It's the fourth general strike of Milei's tenure. He was in Washington at Trump's 'Board of Peace' summit when unions called the walkout — a deliberate show of force in his absence.
Spanish energy company Repsol announced plans to triple its Venezuelan oil output following U.S. approval to resume operations there. CEO Imaz said the company is preparing to restart and is open to additional oil and gas opportunities. This comes roughly seven weeks after U.S. special forces captured Nicolás Maduro on January 3.
U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright — speaking in Paris on the sidelines of an IEA ministerial — said Venezuelan production could climb 30-40% this year. The U.S. goal, Wright said, is to 'dramatically grow' Venezuelan output, improve living conditions, and reduce criminal and migration threats posed to the United States.
Major American oil companies remain reluctant. ConocoPhillips has publicly stated it prefers debt repayment over new drilling. Multiple analysts cited by Asia Times and OilPrice.com note that Big Oil is wary of Venezuela's legal and infrastructure risks without hard state guarantees. The gap between Washington's ambitions and industry appetite is real.
Dark fleet tanker activity off Venezuela has already shifted. According to TradingView, the share of irregular tankers in Venezuelan oil exports dropped to 33% in January 2026 as purchasers diversified following U.S. policy changes — a measurable early indicator of the post-Maduro transition's effect on the energy market.
Colombian authorities captured two senior ELN leaders in Bucaramanga, capital of Santander department, on February 19. The two — César Pérez Serrano and Katiuska Pargas, alias 'Katy' — ran a narco-financing network on the Colombia-Venezuela border and were wanted in over 100 countries for drug trafficking and money laundering. The operation involved Colombia's DIPOL, Ameripol, and Interpol Venezuela.
Separately, the Army's Third Division neutralized two cylinder bombs in the village of La Natala, municipality of Toribío, northern Cauca, on February 19. The devices were attributed to FARC dissident factions and targeted troops conducting territorial control operations. The Army also repelled an attack on an armored vehicle in Arauca the same day.
The U.S. Embassy delivered surveillance drones and monitoring equipment to the Colombian Navy, framed as counternarcotics cooperation. No specific numbers were disclosed, but officials said the gear is intended to protect personnel conducting maritime operations against organized crime.
An expert quoted by Infobae stated flatly that no peace deal with the Clan del Golfo is possible before Petro's term ends — 'there is no possibility.' Separately, France 24 confirmed Colombia has resumed peace talks with the Clan del Golfo after a suspension linked to U.S. pressure, but the outlook is assessed as poor. With the ELN, FARC dissidents, and AGC all still active, Petro's 'total peace' agenda will end without a single signed agreement.
Mexican Navy (SEMAR) intercepted a narco semi-submersible carrying four metric tons of cocaine off Manzanillo, Colima, arresting three people. Security Secretary Omar García Harfuch stated that maritime operations in the past week alone have seized close to 10 tons of cocaine — an unusually high pace for a single seven-day window.
A shootout in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, spread fear through the border city in recent days. Breitbart/Cartel Chronicles reports that local politicians are actively working to downplay the incident, consistent with longstanding patterns of official minimization of cartel violence in border cities.
Mexican Army troops clashed with an armed criminal cell in the municipality of Tenancingo, State of Mexico, on February 19. One person was killed and one wounded. The military was conducting a patrol when it was ambushed directly.
A senior commerce inspection official in Poza Rica, Veracruz, was shot and killed in front of his daughter on a public street. The killing fits a pattern of targeted assassinations of mid-level government functionaries — a tactic cartels use to erode institutional authority without the visibility of attacking military or federal police.
The United States formally demanded Cuba make 'very dramatic changes very soon,' per statements reported by El País English on February 19. Washington is simultaneously applying economic pressure while Secretary of State Marco Rubio maintains back-channel contact with Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, grandson of Raúl Castro.
China's Foreign Ministry responded by pledging full support for Cuba's sovereignty and promising material assistance 'to the best of our ability.' The statement reflects Beijing's intent to use the Cuba crisis as a proxy competition with Washington in the region.
Portugal is routing tourists stuck in Cuba through the Dominican Republic due to severe fuel shortages on the island. Mexico's President Sheinbaum warned of a potential humanitarian crisis. The fuel situation is directly tied to the disruption in Venezuelan oil subsidies following Maduro's removal.
New interim president José María Balcázar — Peru's ninth president in a decade — confirmed he will attend Trump's upcoming Latin American leaders summit in Miami, focused on security cooperation and countering Chinese influence. Bolivia's President Rodrigo Paz made the same commitment on February 20, per AP.
Peru's markets have shown little reaction to the latest presidential transition. Analysts note that the commodity-export-driven economy and a credible central bank have historically insulated investors from political turbulence. Copper production continues at normal levels.
Workers at state oil company Petroperu are in the middle of a 72-hour strike begun Monday to protest partial privatization plans. The company says operations remain normal, and the government has declared the strike illegal — but the action reflects deepening frustration with economic restructuring ahead of April elections.
Brazil's federal government is seeking the extradition of Alexandre Ramagem, former chief of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) from 2019-2022, currently in exile in Florida. Ramagem was identified as part of the 'crucial core' of the 2023 coup plot to keep Jair Bolsonaro in power and was separately convicted for using intelligence tools to illegally surveil political opponents, journalists, and artists.
The extradition request puts the Trump administration in a politically awkward position: Bolsonaro is a Trump ally, and Ramagem is sheltering in the U.S. Whether Washington honors Brazil's extradition request or stonewalls it will be a visible test of the bilateral relationship.
Security forces in Esmeraldas province recorded over 1,300 emergency responses during the four-day Carnival holiday period ending February 19. Incidents included 34 robberies, 53 cases of domestic violence, and one shooting death: 42-year-old Jhon Gómez Hernández was killed inside a residence in the Puerto Limón neighborhood of Esmeraldas city early on February 19.
The Security Bloc — a joint Army-Police deployment — maintained operations at road checkpoints, beaches, and mass gathering points throughout the holiday. Esmeraldas remains among Ecuador's highest-risk provinces due to its position on trafficking routes controlled by factions linked to Los Choneros and Gulf Cartel-affiliated networks.
Honduras signed an agreement in Washington covering regional security cooperation, counternarcotics, and anti-corruption measures, per Infobae. The accord is framed as repositioning Honduras as a safer destination for investment. Honduras occupies a central role in northbound drug transit routes and is under sustained U.S. pressure to demonstrate tangible results.
The U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) reinforced its cooperation framework with El Salvador, per Infobae. The ONDCP document identifying major drug-transit countries includes Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama — a near-complete sweep of the isthmus, reflecting how thoroughly Central America is integrated into northbound trafficking routes.
Remittances to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras jumped 20% in 2025, per the International Organization for Migration. That's economically significant — and it also means diaspora financial flows are outpacing local economic development, reinforcing the migration dynamics that have defined U.S.-Central America relations for the past decade.
ELEVATED. Cartel violence is geographically dispersed — from Matamoros on the Gulf coast to Manzanillo on the Pacific and Tenancingo in central Mexico. The Sinaloa cartel's internal split continues to push conflict into new states. Maritime interdiction is running hot, but land-based violence against officials and civilians is not abating. Watch the Matamoros situation and any Sinaloa faction moves toward new territorial consolidation.
ELEVATED. The attorney general's office continues its legal campaign against independent journalists and reformist figures. The case of journalist José Rubén Zamora — under house arrest after 800+ days in detention — illustrates how prosecution is being used as a political tool. Security structures from before Arévalo remain intact. Criminal impunity is the baseline operating condition.
MODERATE. No significant security incidents in the last 24 hours. Belize remains listed by ONDCP as a drug-transit country. Gang activity in Belize City is chronic but not currently escalating.
ELEVATED. The Washington security agreement is a diplomatic positive, but on-the-ground conditions remain shaped by entrenched trafficking networks and institutional weakness. The government's credibility on anti-corruption pledges is still unproven. Watch whether the accord produces measurable operational cooperation or remains a paper commitment.
MODERATE. Bukele's gang crackdown has suppressed visible violence, but the state of exception continues to generate human rights concerns. New ONDCP cooperation reinforces the U.S.-El Salvador security relationship. The underlying criminal economy — particularly drug transit — has not been dismantled, just driven underground.
HIGH. The Ortega regime's use of La Modelo prison — originally built for high-risk organized crime suspects — against political prisoners remains a focal point. The U.S. sanctioned the prison's director this week, drawing backing from opposition figures in exile. Repression of dissent shows no sign of easing as Ortega consolidates authoritarian control.
ELEVATED. President Chaves is heading to Trump's Miami summit seeking security assistance. Homicide rates have trended upward, tied to drug transit and illegal gold mining near the Nicaraguan border at Crucitas. Costa Rica is experiencing slow but measurable erosion of its historically safe operating environment.
MODERATE. No significant security incidents in the last 24 hours. Panama leads Central America in air traffic growth and passport strength — indicators of a relatively stable operating environment. The Darién remains an active migration and smuggling corridor, but no acute escalation reported today.
HIGH. Operationally, security forces had a strong 24 hours — two ELN leaders captured, IEDs neutralized in Cauca, U.S. drone equipment delivered. But the structural picture is deteriorating: armed group membership is up 23% entering 2026 (FIP), child recruitment has quadrupled in five years (UNICEF), and Petro will leave office without a single peace deal. The conflict is not winding down.
HIGH. The post-Maduro transition is generating real energy-sector movement, but political consolidation is incomplete. The U.S. is managing an occupied petrostate with ambitious production targets and a skeptical private sector. Criminal networks — Tren de Aragua and allied groups — remain embedded in Venezuelan territory. The dark fleet's partial retreat is a positive signal, but the country's security architecture is being rebuilt from scratch.
HIGH. The Carnival period passed without major mass-casualty incidents, but baseline violence in Esmeraldas and other coastal provinces remains elevated. Noboa's security crackdown has fragmented criminal networks without eliminating them, and some factions have responded with increased brutality. The strategic question — whether repression or negotiation produces durable security — is unresolved.
ELEVATED. Balcázar's installation as the ninth president in a decade is now baseline, not exceptional — which tells you everything about Peru's political environment. Markets are calm, copper keeps flowing, and the central bank has credibility. But the April election cycle is a source of uncertainty, and China's role at Chancay port is becoming a live campaign issue.
MODERATE. President Rodrigo Paz is engaging constructively with the U.S.-led regional security framework, confirmed for Trump's Miami summit. Domestic conditions are stable but fragile — coca production politics and residual Morales-era political tensions remain background risks.
ELEVATED. The Ramagem extradition request is the active story. Brazil's federal police apparatus is functioning effectively on high-profile investigations, but the political fault line between the Lula government and Bolsonaro's network is sharp and unresolved. Rio's organized crime — PCC and Comando Vermelho — remains a chronic security challenge independent of federal politics.
MODERATE. No significant security incidents in the last 24 hours. The Tri-Border Area continues to serve as a money-laundering and contraband hub. Paraguay's institutional capacity to address organized crime remains limited but the security situation is not acutely deteriorating.
MODERATE. No significant security incidents in the last 24 hours. Uruguay maintains the most stable security environment in the Southern Cone. Drug-related crime in Montevideo is a growing concern but well within manageable parameters.
ELEVATED. The general strike paralyzed the capital and disrupted regional aviation, but Milei's reform is moving forward regardless. The political risk is real: four general strikes in one presidential term reflects a mobilized opposition, and if the lower house passes the bill, expect sustained social unrest through March. The Port of Rosario 48-hour action is the most economically significant pressure point to watch.
MODERATE. Santiago airport absorbed minor disruption from the Argentine strike spillover — a peripheral effect, not a domestic crisis. Chile's security environment is relatively stable. Drug trafficking through Pacific ports and Venezuelan migrant-linked crime in northern regions remain the primary ongoing concerns.
CRITICAL. The island is in acute crisis: fuel shortages, U.S. maximum-pressure demands, and a back-channel negotiation whose outcome is genuinely uncertain. China has pledged support, but material deliveries take time. The humanitarian trajectory is negative — tourism disruptions, fuel rationing, and economic contraction are all accelerating simultaneously.
CRITICAL. No new developments in the last 24 hours from available OSINT, but baseline conditions remain catastrophic. Gang control of Port-au-Prince approaches 85% of territory. The Kenyan-led MSS mission has not reversed the security situation. Any further disruption to food or fuel imports would constitute a humanitarian emergency.
MODERATE. The DR is currently serving as a transit hub for tourists evacuating Cuba — a low-security role, but a visible indicator of Cuba's deterioration. Domestically, no significant security incidents reported. Drug transit activity through the island is chronic but not acutely escalating.
MODERATE. No significant security incidents in the last 24 hours. Guyana's oil boom continues to attract foreign investment and geopolitical attention. The Venezuela border remains a potential flashpoint given Caracas's historic territorial claims to Essequibo, though the post-Maduro government has not escalated on this front.
Watch Argentina through the end of February. Milei appears to have the votes to pass the Labor Modernization bill, and that outcome will trigger a decision point for the CGT: does organized labor escalate, or accept defeat and regroup? The Port of Rosario 48-hour maritime strike is the pressure point I'd track most closely — Argentina is the world's top exporter of soy meal and soy oil, and any meaningful disruption to Rosario cargo operations hits global commodity markets, not just Argentine ones. If the reform passes and unions fail to stop it, expect Milei to read that as a mandate for the next phase of his economic program.
The Venezuela energy picture needs a reality check from decision-makers. Washington is projecting confidence — 30-40% production growth this year — but the industrial infrastructure to achieve that is in serious disrepair after two decades of underinvestment, and no major American firm has committed capital. Repsol's announcement is real, but tripling output from a low base in a collapsing infrastructure environment is an 18-24 month project at minimum, not a 2026 story. The more immediate security implication is what happens to Tren de Aragua and allied Venezuelan criminal structures as the new government tries to consolidate control. Those networks are embedded across the continent — Colombia, Peru, Chile, Ecuador — and a disruptive transition in Caracas could push their leadership into new operational postures.
Colombia's peace process is functionally over under Petro. He leaves office without a deal with the ELN, FARC dissidents, or the Clan del Golfo. The question for whoever wins the next election is whether they renegotiate from scratch or shift toward a harder military approach. The 23% increase in armed group membership entering 2026 and the quadrupling of child recruitment suggest the groups are not feeling pressure to negotiate — they're expanding. The ELN bust in Bucaramanga and the Cauca IED neutralization are tactical wins, but the strategic picture is moving the wrong direction.
Cuba is the wildcard. Rubio's back-channel with Raúl Castro's grandson is either the opening of a historic deal or a pressure tactic with no real endpoint — and right now it's genuinely hard to tell which. What's clear is that Beijing is not going to let Cuba fall into Washington's orbit without a fight. China's pledge of material support is not symbolic; Beijing has kept the Castro government alive through economic lifelines before and will do it again if the strategic calculus demands it. A Cuba that survives the current crisis with Chinese backing and without making concessions to Washington would be a significant defeat for U.S. regional policy — and Trump would own it personally.
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