Sinaloa continues to bleed. EL PAÍS reports sustained violence in the state as the Chapitos-Zambada faction war grinds on. Culiacán sits near the top of the country's most insecure cities after a brief period of relative calm, per Infobae. The split between factions remains the primary driver of violence, with no sign of resolution.
The DEA flagged a possible alliance between Los Chapitos and CJNG, per EL PAÍS. If confirmed, this would reshape Mexico's cartel map entirely. CJNG already dominates multiple states. An operational partnership with one Sinaloa faction would give them leverage across traditional Sinaloa strongholds. This is the kind of shift that cascades.
Mexican authorities sent 37 accused cartel members to the US, part of what CBS calls a deal with the Trump administration. BBC confirms 26 of those were cartel operatives. This represents a policy shift for Mexico City—previously resistant to extraditions at scale. Sheinbaum is feeling pressure from Washington and trying to manage it without looking like she's capitulating entirely.
Mexican forces seized 500 kilos of meth and thousands of fentanyl pills in a Sinaloa Cartel operation, per Latin Times. Seizures are up, but production isn't slowing. The fentanyl pipeline remains intact despite interdiction efforts.
Separate violence in Michoacán, Jalisco, and Guanajuato left two police officers dead and triggered road blockades, Forbes México reports. The dispute involves two cartels fighting over overlapping territory. This tri-state zone is a persistent hotspot where CJNG, remnants of local groups, and Sinaloa-aligned cells collide.
Oil revenue topped $1 billion, and Venezuela's energy secretary says funds will no longer flow through the Qatar escrow account, per CNBC. This is a significant financial shift. If accurate, it suggests the Maduro government (or whatever entity controls oil apparatus now) is bypassing previous oversight mechanisms entirely.
The US eased sanctions to allow oil majors broader operating scope in Venezuela, per Reuters. This is the geopolitical carrot—Washington wants Venezuelan oil back on the market to stabilize global supply and counter Chinese influence. The timing aligns with reports of Maduro's capture or ouster, though concrete details remain murky.
Multiple outlets (CFR, DGAP, Al Jazeera) are analyzing what regime change or transition in Venezuela means for energy markets. The consensus: Venezuela's oil sector remains deeply compromised by years of underinvestment, corruption, and sanctions. Even with sanctions relief, production won't spike overnight. GIS Reports calls the sector 'uninvestable' without major structural reforms.
Petro's government suspended the ceasefire with a FARC dissident faction, per Reuters. The 'total peace' framework is fracturing. CFR notes that partial peace—managing ceasefires with some groups while fighting others—is now the best remaining option for Petro. The strategy is messy, and it's unclear how long even partial truces will hold.
Colombia agreed to extend the truce with the ELN, per Al Jazeera and France 24. The ELN remains the largest active insurgent group. Keeping them at the table is the centerpiece of Petro's peace agenda. But the Colombian military killed six ELN fighters ahead of the truce extension, per The Defense Post, which shows how thin the ice is.
Child recruitment by armed groups is surging again. CAMBIO Colombia, IPS Noticias, and Crisis Group all flag rising recruitment of minors by ELN, FARC dissidents, and criminal bands. This is a bellwether for conflict intensity—when groups recruit kids at scale, it signals manpower shortages and territorial contestation.
Catatumbo remains a flashpoint. DW and UN News report ongoing clashes between armed groups in the region. It's a critical corridor for coca production and cross-border smuggling into Venezuela. La FM speculates that if Maduro's gone, the ELN may pull back into Colombia from Venezuelan safe havens, which could intensify territorial fights.
Noboa declared war on 22 gangs when he took office. Now he faces many more, per ACLED. Reuters confirms that the government's crackdown fractured larger criminal networks into smaller, more violent cells. This is the paradox of aggressive enforcement without accompanying governance capacity—you don't eliminate the threat, you atomize it.
Five soccer players have been murdered in 2025, per EL PAÍS, including defender Mario Pineida, killed in Guayaquil, per ESPN. InSight Crime calls a recent massacre in Guayaquil a 'harsh reminder' of Ecuador's security reality. Organized crime is not just targeting rivals—it's targeting visible public figures to demonstrate power and sow fear.
Atlantic Council published a deep dive on how criminal networks are recruiting Ecuador's youth. Gangs offer money, identity, and protection in communities where the state offers none. This is Ecuador's long-term crisis: a generation being absorbed into criminal structures. Crisis Group and GI-TOC reports paint a grim picture of entrenched organized crime with transnational reach.
InSight Crime notes panic over gang exodus from El Salvador, but actual arrests remain low. Bukele's mass incarceration strategy displaced some gang members, but there's limited evidence of large-scale migration to neighboring countries. The fear is real, the data less so. Honduras and Guatemala are watching closely.
Migration flows from the Northern Triangle continue. WOLA published a report from Honduras tracking migrants heading north. AS/COA reports that applications for Cubans, Haitians, and Venezuelans have been paused under Trump administration policy shifts. PBS maps where deportations are sending people—back into the same violence and instability they fled.
Threat level remains ELEVATED. Sinaloa cartel infighting continues to drive violence in Culiacán and surrounding areas. A potential Chapitos-CJNG alliance would be a major strategic realignment with national implications. Extraditions to the US signal policy shifts under Sheinbaum, likely in response to US pressure. Watch for further violence in Michoacán-Jalisco-Guanajuato corridor and any confirmation of the CJNG-Chapitos link.
Threat level ELEVATED amid significant political and economic uncertainty. Reports suggest Maduro may have been captured or ousted, though details remain unclear. Oil revenue is bypassing previous oversight mechanisms, and the US is easing sanctions to bring Venezuelan oil back online. Energy sector remains crippled by years of underinvestment. Watch for clarity on regime status and how armed groups (ELN, colectivos) respond to any transition.
Threat level ELEVATED. Petro's 'total peace' strategy is unraveling into selective truces. ELN ceasefire extended but fragile, with military clashes continuing. FARC dissident ceasefire suspended. Child recruitment is surging, a sign of intensifying territorial competition. Catatumbo remains a critical flashpoint. If Venezuelan safe havens collapse, expect armed groups to consolidate in Colombia, increasing violence.
Threat level HIGH. Noboa's crackdown fragmented large gangs into more numerous, violent cells. Organized crime is targeting public figures, including athletes, to project power. Youth recruitment by criminal networks is accelerating in marginalized communities. Guayaquil remains the epicenter, but violence is spreading. Without governance investment alongside enforcement, Ecuador faces a protracted internal conflict.
Threat level MODERATE but with regional spillover concerns. Bukele's mass incarceration strategy has suppressed visible gang activity domestically, but fears of gang migration to Honduras and Guatemala persist. Actual evidence of large-scale exodus remains thin. Watch for any uptick in violence in neighboring countries that can be credibly linked to Salvadoran gang displacement.
Threat level MODERATE. Migration north continues as economic and security conditions stagnate. Concerns about MS-13 and Barrio 18 members entering from El Salvador, though arrests remain low. Domestic gang structures remain active but not currently escalating. Watch for any spillover from Salvadoran gang displacement or shifts in regional trafficking routes.
I'm watching the potential Chapitos-CJNG alliance closely. The DEA doesn't float these warnings casually. If Los Chapitos, backed into a corner by the Zambada faction, cut a deal with Mencho's people, it fundamentally redraws Mexico's cartel geography. CJNG gets access to Sinaloa's US distribution infrastructure and border corridors. The Chapitos get muscle and diversification at a moment when they're vulnerable. This would be the most significant cartel realignment since the Sinaloa-Juárez split, and it could trigger a broader wave of violence as other groups scramble to adapt.
Venezuela's oil revenue bypassing the Qatar escrow is a big deal that's getting lost in the noise. That escrow account was supposed to ensure funds went to humanitarian needs and monitored spending. If Caracas—or whatever faction controls the energy ministry now—is routing money elsewhere, it raises questions about sanctions enforcement, who actually controls the state apparatus, and where that billion dollars is going. If the US is easing sanctions while simultaneously losing financial oversight, we're back to the old problem: oil money flowing into opaque networks with no accountability.
Ecuador's fragmentation problem is going to get worse before it gets better. Noboa went hard on enforcement without building governance capacity in the communities where gangs recruit. Now instead of a few large organizations you could negotiate with or target strategically, you have dozens of cells with younger, more reckless leadership. They're killing soccer players in broad daylight. That's not desperation—that's a demonstration of control. The state doesn't have the investigative or judicial capacity to respond at scale, so impunity becomes the norm. This is a multi-year crisis now, not a spike.
Colombia's child recruitment surge tells you everything about where the conflict is heading. Armed groups recruit kids when they need bodies fast—either because they're taking casualties, expanding territory, or both. The ELN, FARC dissidents, and criminal bands are all doing it, which means competition for territory is intensifying even as Petro tries to negotiate peace. If Venezuelan safe havens collapse due to regime change, those groups will consolidate in Colombia, and the recruitment will accelerate further. Petro's partial peace strategy might keep some groups at the table, but it won't stop the fighting on the ground."
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