Sinaloa cartel factionalization continues to drive violence in the northwest. Clashes between Chapitos and Mayos factions in Culiacán and surrounding municipalities have displaced over 1,200 families since January, according to local civil protection authorities. Checkpoints and armed convoys are now routine in what was already contested territory.
The Jalisco cartel is pushing hard into Zacatecas and southern Durango. CJNG appears to be exploiting the Sinaloa infighting, moving product routes and challenging local plaza bosses. Expect more bodies and more banners as they try to flip or eliminate local operators.
Migration enforcement is tightening again along the southern and northern borders. INM and National Guard deployments increased notably this week in Chiapas and Tamaulipas, likely responding to U.S. pressure after a uptick in crossings in January. Smuggling fees are reportedly climbing as routes narrow.
Femicide numbers remain stubborn. The first six weeks of 2026 tracked nearly identical to last year's pace—roughly 7-8 confirmed cases weekly according to federal data. Edomex, Veracruz, and Nuevo León continue to lead. Little political appetite to address root causes beyond rhetoric.
The Maduro government is prepping for another round of loyalty tests within PSUV ranks. Internal circulars leaked this week suggest party purges targeting mid-level officials seen as insufficiently enthusiastic about the post-election consolidation. This is classic regime maintenance, but it signals nervousness.
Oil production is hovering around 780,000 bpd, a modest uptick from late 2025 but nowhere near the million-barrel mark Maduro promised. PDVSA infrastructure is still crumbling and technician brain drain hasn't reversed. China and Russia are keeping things afloat, but just barely.
Irregular armed group activity is up in Apure and Bolívar states. ELN and Colombian dissident factions continue to control transit routes and extortion rackets, particularly around mining zones. The Maduro government tolerates this as long as it doesn't threaten regime stability or oil flows.
Migration outflows are steady but not surging. Roughly 25,000-30,000 Venezuelans are leaving monthly via Colombia, Brazil, and the Caribbean routes. Economic desperation remains the primary driver, not acute political persecution. Host countries are increasingly fatigued.
ELN ceasefire talks are stalled and violence is ticking back up. The sixth cycle in Caracas ended without agreement on monitoring mechanisms, and ELN fronts in Chocó, Arauca, and Catatumbo have resumed selective killings and extortion. Petro's paz total strategy is looking more aspirational than operational.
Dissident FARC factions are consolidating control in the southeast. Segunda Marquetalia and the so-called Estado Mayor Central are competing for cocaine production zones in Caquetá, Putumayo, and Meta. Clashes between these groups and with security forces killed at least 18 people in the past two weeks, per local ombudsman reports.
Coca cultivation hit a new record last year according to preliminary UN estimates—around 253,000 hectares. Eradication programs remain politically contentious and ineffective. The crop substitution model under the peace accords never scaled, and farmers have zero economic alternatives in most zones.
Urban crime is the top polling concern heading into 2026 local elections. Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali all report double-digit increases in extortion, robbery, and homicide compared to last year. Petro's approval ratings are tanking, and the right is hammering him on security failures.
The Noboa government extended the estado de excepción for the eighth consecutive time. This allows military deployment in prisons and high-crime areas, but it's no longer producing the dramatic violence drops seen in early 2025. Guayaquil's homicide rate is creeping back up—15 murders in the first 10 days of February.
Prison massacres remain a real risk. Authorities transferred 200 high-value cartel targets to the new mega-prison in Santa Elena, but intelligence suggests Los Lobos, Los Choneros, and other factions are already maneuvering for control inside. Rival factions in the same facility is a powder keg.
Port security at Guayaquil remains the weak link. Cocaine seizures are up, but that likely reflects increased export attempts rather than improved interdiction. Corrupt port workers, container firms, and customs officials are still enabling bulk shipments to Europe and Asia. The cartels aren't going anywhere.
El Salvador's Bukele is preparing for a constitutional fight. Rumors are swirling that he'll push for a mechanism to extend his presidency beyond the current term, despite previous signals he'd step back. His Nuevas Ideas party controls the assembly, so it's feasible. Regional democrats are watching closely.
Guatemala's Arévalo government is still battling judicial and legislative sabotage. The attorney general's office continues to pursue bogus cases against Semilla party members, and conservative lawmakers are blocking anti-corruption reforms. Arévalo has popular support but limited institutional leverage.
Honduras is seeing a uptick in organized crime violence in the north. Cortés and Atlántida departments reported 40+ homicides in January, many linked to drug transit and extortion rackets. The Xiomara Castro government's security policies remain unclear and under-resourced.
Gang control of Port-au-Prince is near total. The G9 and G-Pep federations dominate most neighborhoods, and the Kenyan-led MSS mission has failed to roll back territorial control. Humanitarian access is severely constrained, and sexual violence is endemic in gang-controlled zones.
The transitional government is paralyzed by infighting. The presidential council is split, and Prime Minister Conille has limited authority or capacity. No elections are on the horizon. The international community is running out of patience and options.
Cholera cases are rising again, with over 400 new cases reported in the past two weeks according to WHO. Displacement, water insecurity, and collapsed health infrastructure are compounding the crisis. This is a slow-motion catastrophe.
Threat level is ELEVATED due to ongoing Sinaloa cartel factionalization in the northwest and CJNG expansion in the Bajío and central regions. Violence is concentrated but intense, with displacement and checkpoint proliferation in Sinaloa, Durango, and Zacatecas. Migration enforcement pressure is increasing on both borders, complicating smuggling operations. Femicide rates remain stubbornly high with limited government response. Watch for escalation if CJNG makes further territorial gains while Sinaloa factions are distracted.
Threat level is MODERATE with authoritarian consolidation continuing apace. Internal party purges signal regime nervousness but no immediate instability. Oil production remains weak, limiting economic recovery and maintaining emigration pressure. Irregular armed groups control large swaths of border and resource zones with regime tolerance. Political opposition is neutralized, but economic desperation and migration outflows persist. Watch for friction between Maduro and armed groups if interests diverge.
Threat level is ELEVATED as Petro's peace strategy unravels. ELN ceasefire collapsed, dissident FARC factions are consolidating territorial control, and coca cultivation hit a record high. Rural violence is intensifying in Chocó, Arauca, Catatumbo, and the southern departments. Urban crime is surging and dominating political discourse ahead of local elections. Petro's approval is cratering. Watch for security force frustration and potential policy shifts if violence continues to climb.
Threat level is ELEVATED despite Noboa's extended emergency measures. Initial violence reductions are plateauing, and Guayaquil homicides are rising again. Prison stability is fragile with rival cartel factions concentrated in new facilities. Port corruption remains unchecked, enabling cocaine exports. The government is buying time but not solving structural problems. Watch for prison violence and gang retaliation against security operations.
Threat level is MODERATE with divergent trajectories. El Salvador's Bukele may push constitutional boundaries for extended rule, testing democratic norms. Guatemala's Arévalo faces institutional sabotage but retains popular support. Honduras is seeing organized crime violence tick upward in the north with weak government response. Migration pressures remain high across the region, driven by economic stagnation and insecurity. Watch for Bukele's next political move and Guatemala's judicial battles.
Threat level is CRITICAL. Gangs control most of Port-au-Prince and the Kenyan-led mission has failed to reverse this. The transitional government is dysfunctional and elections are not on the horizon. Humanitarian conditions are catastrophic, with rising cholera, sexual violence, and displacement. The international community has no effective strategy. Watch for complete state collapse and humanitarian exodus if gang control expands further.
Sinaloa cartel fragmentation is creating openings that CJNG is aggressively exploiting. The Chapitos-Mayos war isn't ending anytime soon, and every week they're bleeding resources and fighters, CJNG is moving into contested plazas in Zacatecas, Durango, and even parts of Baja California Sur. We're watching whether CJNG can hold these gains or if they overextend. If they consolidate, Mexico's cartel map gets redrawn and violence spreads to new regions. The government has no coherent strategy to interrupt this.
Colombia's paz total is effectively dead, and we're back to fragmented armed group competition. The ELN walked away from talks, dissident factions are more powerful than ever, and coca production just hit a record. Petro has no Plan B. The military is frustrated and local communities are trapped between armed groups and state neglect. I'm watching whether the security forces start acting unilaterally, which could mean extrajudicial operations and a breakdown in civilian oversight. Urban crime is also becoming a political crisis that could reshape the 2026 elections.
Ecuador's emergency state is losing effectiveness, and the prison system is a time bomb. Noboa got a short-term violence reduction by flooding the streets with troops, but cartel structures are intact and adapting. The new mega-prison in Santa Elena is concentrating rival factions in one facility, which is insane from a security perspective. If we see another massacre there, it'll be worse than Guayaquil 2021. Port corruption isn't being addressed, so export operations continue. This is a holding pattern, not a solution.
Haiti is beyond stabilization with current resources and political will. The MSS mission doesn't have the mandate, numbers, or capability to dismantle gang federations. The transitional government is a joke, and no elections are feasible under these conditions. Cholera is spreading again, sexual violence is endemic, and humanitarian access is collapsing. The international community is stuck between ineffective intervention and complete abandonment. I'm watching whether donor fatigue leads to mission drawdown, which would be catastrophic but increasingly likely."
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