The Sinaloa Cartel split is getting worse, not better. Factions loyal to Los Chapitos and the Zambada wing have pushed homicide rates in Sinaloa and Sonora up roughly 35% compared to this time last year. Culiacán and the Sonora-Sinaloa border corridor are the hot zones.
What makes this different from previous cartel fractures: both sides kept their logistics intact. These aren't street gangs fighting over corners. They're parallel supply chain operators with reach into the U.S. and working ties to CJNG remnants in the border zones.
The government's targeted arrest strategy hasn't slowed the violence. Civilian displacement from rural Sinaloa is accelerating, and cartel checkpoints on Highway 15 near Guasave are becoming routine. This isn't cooling down before summer.
Ecuador's security situation is the most acute in South America right now. Gang violence in Guayaquil, Durán, and Esmeraldas isn't episodic anymore. It's structural. Los Choneros, Los Lobos, and smaller cells operate with a level of impunity that points to either corrupted enforcement or complete state absence in key neighborhoods.
The real fight is over the port. Guayaquil is one of the most important cocaine export nodes in the hemisphere. Control over dock access, container routing, and port worker coercion is the prize. Colombian and Mexican trafficking networks are deeply embedded in these supply chains.
That means violence in Guayaquil has direct implications for cartel logistics from Tumaco to Tijuana. If Ecuador can't stabilize its ports, cocaine moves north cheaper and faster.
Maduro's government keeps weaponizing migration and security policy as diplomatic leverage, particularly toward Colombia and Brazil. With over 7.7 million Venezuelans displaced since 2015, the border zones in Táchira, Apure, and Zulia are hybrid conflict areas where ELN dissidents, FARC remnants, and Maduro-aligned colectivos share operating space.
ELN units in Apure are now taxing Colombian cattle smugglers and gasoline traffickers at rates higher than what they charge inside Colombia. That reversal tells you how collapsed Venezuelan state authority is in the periphery.
Colombia's Petro administration has tried a diplomatic reset with Caracas, but the ground reality hasn't changed. Venezuelan territory is a safe haven for Colombian armed groups when pressure mounts. Brazil is quietly reinforcing its northern border in Roraima as Venezuelan gang activity creeps into Brazilian mining zones.
ELN peace talks are stalled, and field commanders are acting accordingly. Attacks on oil infrastructure in Arauca and Norte de Santander are up in recent weeks. That's a classic ELN pressure move when negotiations drag.
FARC dissident groups, particularly EMC and Segunda Marquetalia, are expanding in Caquetá, Putumayo, and Nariño. These aren't ideological guerrillas in the traditional sense. They're cocaine production and trafficking operations with political rhetoric.
Tumaco is the flashpoint. It's a major cocaine export hub, and control over the mangroves and river access is contested daily. Drugs moving through Tumaco often end up in Esmeraldas or Guayaquil for onward shipment. Colombia's problems and Ecuador's problems are the same supply chain.
The Bukele model is being studied across the isthmus, but implementation is uneven. El Salvador's state-of-exception policies drove homicide rates to historic lows at enormous human rights cost. Honduras under Xiomara Castro has tried a softer version with mixed results. Gang violence in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula is down but not gone.
Guatemala's situation is more fragmented. Organized crime groups tied to drug trafficking, particularly in Petén and Izabal, operate alongside local extortion gangs. The common thread across all three countries: weak states trying to project strength without the institutional capacity to sustain it.
Mexican cartels, particularly Sinaloa and CJNG, are using Central America as a storage and transshipment zone. The Northern Triangle isn't producing 2015-level violence, but it's producing instability that feeds migration and organized crime adaptation.
PCC's international logistics role is growing fast. The group has deep ties to Bolivian cocaine production zones and is expanding its footprint into Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay. Violence in São Paulo is relatively controlled, but PCC's reach is anything but local.
They coordinate with Colombian suppliers and move product through the River Plate corridor and Brazilian ports like Santos. The Lula government's security focus has been on Amazon deforestation enforcement rather than urban crime, leaving PCC space to operate as long as it keeps violence below political thresholds.
Threat level remains elevated, driven by sustained Sinaloa Cartel infighting in the northwest and CJNG territorial expansion in Michoacán, Jalisco, and Guanajuato. Violence is concentrated but increasing—Culiacán, Guasave, Tijuana, and Celaya are all seeing weekly armed confrontations. Civilian displacement from rural Sinaloa is accelerating, and cartel checkpoints on major highways are becoming routine. Watch for further fracturing within Sinaloa factions and any CJNG moves to exploit the chaos. Mexico City and tourist zones remain relatively insulated, but that's a function of cartel calculation, not state control.
Threat level is high, particularly in border states (Táchira, Apure, Zulia) where ELN, FARC dissidents, and colectivos operate with near-total freedom. The Maduro government uses security chaos as a diplomatic tool and has no incentive to stabilize peripheral areas it doesn't fully control. Caracas remains relatively stable, but that's the only part of the country where the state functions predictably. Colombian and Brazilian border zones are increasingly affected by spillover. Expect continued migration outflows and exploitation of Venezuelan territory by Colombian armed groups.
Threat level is elevated and trending upward. ELN talks are stuck, and the group is responding with attacks on oil infrastructure in Arauca and Norte de Santander. FARC dissidents control significant territory in southern Colombia and are deeply embedded in cocaine production. Petro's 'Total Peace' strategy has produced more ceasefires than disarmaments, and armed groups are using negotiation periods to consolidate. Tumaco, Caquetá, and Putumayo remain high-risk areas. Urban violence in major cities is low, but rural and border zones are effectively contested space.
Threat level is high. Ecuador has the worst security deterioration trajectory in South America. Gang violence in Guayaquil, Durán, and Esmeraldas is persistent and increasingly brazen. The prison system remains a battleground for control among Los Choneros, Los Lobos, and other factions. The Noboa government's emergency measures have not reversed the trend. The key issue is port control—Guayaquil is a top-tier cocaine export hub, and organized crime groups are fighting over logistics access. Expect continued violence and possible spillover into southern Colombia and northern Peru.
Threat level is moderate but complicated. Violence is lower than in previous years, but organized crime networks remain deeply embedded, particularly in Petén, Izabal, and the western highlands. Drug trafficking corridors are active, and Mexican cartels use Guatemala for transshipment and temporary storage. Extortion and local gang activity continue in Guatemala City and secondary cities. The state lacks the capacity for sustained enforcement outside the capital. Migration pressure toward Mexico and the U.S. remains high, and that flow is both a symptom and an enabler of organized crime.
Threat level is moderate. Homicide rates have declined under the Castro government, but extortion networks and gang presence remain significant in Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and the north coast. Organized crime groups tied to drug trafficking operate in low-visibility mode, particularly in coastal zones and along the Guatemalan border. The government's security strategy is more rhetorically aggressive than operationally effective. Migration outflows continue, and cartel logistics networks treat Honduras as a waypoint rather than a contested prize.
Sinaloa corridor escalation. If either cartel faction moves to control Highway 15 more aggressively, displacement will spike and cross-border logistics into Arizona and California get messier. The factions retained too much operational capacity after the split for this to burn out on its own.
Ecuador's port security in Guayaquil. Another high-profile assassination or prison massacre would confirm that Noboa's emergency measures have failed to disrupt gang command-and-control. That has supply chain implications for the entire Pacific cocaine corridor, not just Ecuador.
ELN activity in Arauca and Norte de Santander. Oil infrastructure attacks are the most reliable indicator that talks are dead. An uptick signals a return to full hostilities, and that unravels Petro's entire negotiation framework.
PCC logistics coordination in the Amazon and River Plate corridor. PCC operates quietly, but when they move, it reshapes trafficking flows across the southern cone. Any sign of expanded coordination with Colombian groups is worth flagging early. These four pressure points are connected. Cartel adaptation in Mexico depends on supply reliability from Colombia and Ecuador. Colombian armed groups depend on Venezuelan safe havens. Everyone depends on ports and logistics nodes staying predictable. If any one of these blows, the others feel it within a week.
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